from Coups to Military
I want to link our previous main themes
which was the 1966 Coups in
Historically as far as
and although the 60s-70s are ofte4n seen as the years of coups and military intervention against the civilian government, we perhaps ought to look at the graphics for this from the EU ISS report
Thus we need to go further than simply coups: African states face a raft of different forms of military activity which to some degree are reflective of the 'New Wars' tag. But he very instability of many African states suggests that they were doing new Wars' long before Mary Kaldor came up with the phrase!
Having had a look at the picture of military intervention in more recent years (than the 60s) we need to go back to some classic discussions of the military - in part because you should know of these because they are classic and because they can open up the factors that shape activity.
S E Finer - The Man on Horseback (1962 et seq.)
Prior to Finer’s work, political scientists had approached coup d’etats as a set of ephemeral, exceptional and isolated experiments by the military in governmental politics. Finer approached the coup from a fresh new perspective, one which recognized the increasing tendency of military intervention as a peculiar political phenomenon that was abiding, deep seated and distinctive. In contrast to popular opinion at the time, his belief was that direct military rule was an emerging distinctive kind of regime and that the military could become an important independent political force in itself.
an exposition of the political strengths of the military in terms of its organization, coherence, virtues and structure before going on to examine the weaknesses of the military as a political organization.
He peels back the façade of invisibility and mystery which often shroud military affairs and exposes two crippling weaknesses of the military – their technical inability to govern and their lack of legitimacy – which preclude them from ruling without civilian collaboration.
He argues that military intervention is often more common when there is a concomitant increase in the dependence of civilian governments on the military and a decrease in the popularity of the civilian governments.
He categorizes military intervention in politics into four levels.
The first – influence - is the case where the military merely presses the civilian government to implement policies which the military deems appropriate.
The second – pressures or blackmail – is the case where the military seeks to convince civilian powers to do its bidding by threat of some sanction.
The third level – displacement – is the case where the military replaces one cabinet or set of civilian politicians with another more compliant set through the use of violence or threat of violence.
The last level – supplantment – completely sweeps away the civilian regimes and establishes a military one in its place. This classification was a useful construct at the time because it highlighted and neatly categorized the diverse universe of coups that were occurring at the time.
Finer also examines the modes of intervention through which these four levels of influence could be expressed. He argues that the military could use collusion, intimidation, threats of non-cooperation or violence in their quest to influence the civilian powers that be. Finer concludes his book by looking at the past and future of military interventions.
Luttwak: Coup d'etat (1969 et seq.)
Luttwak’s book, Coup d’etat: A Practical Handbook, published in 1969, grapples with the mechanics of how a coup is actually organized. He goes to some lengths to distinguish the classical coup’detat from other forms of extra-constitutional overthrows such as revolutions, civil wars and insurgencies. In his conception, a coup is distinct from many of the other forms of state capture because of its lack of reliance on the intervention of the masses. He asserts that most coups are politically neutral, in the sense that there are no discernable policies that tend to be followed after the seizure of power.
One aspect of the coup phenomenon that receives almost no attention in Finer’s work is the question of what the preconditions for a coup are. Luttwak tries to answer this question by painting a picture of the kind of environment that would be favorable to potential coup makers.
He summarizes these conditions into three – the confinement of political participation to a small minority, a politically independent state with limited foreign influence in its internal affairs and a non-ethically structured identifiable political centre.
Drawing on the fact that most of the officer corps in the armies were drawn from the middle classes, Samuel Huntington, in his widely read work, Political Order in Changing Societies, surmises that the source of coups and military intervention in politics in general was as a result of the struggle for dominance between the economic classes of society.
Other writers such as Jose Nun and Guillermo O’Donnell have followed in this tradition, alleging the existence of an alliance between the military and the elite and upper classes of society to monopolize power, excluding the middle and lower classes from the political processes. It is therefore the tension between the classes that leads to most coup d’etats.
Onwumechili: The aims of the military intervention
There are numerous reasons for military coups, but over the years most
historians or scholars have simply assumed that the reasons are those that are
often announced by the coup plotters themselves (
Those assumptions can often be classified as following either
the development thesis or the guardian perspective.
The development thesis arrogates the title of people's representatives
to military coup leaders, who claim to have militarily intervened on the behalf
of downtrodden citizens. These types of coups occur in developing nations (thus
explaining the name development thesis), where citizen political activity is considered
weak and the military, being a strong and nationally organized group, is
left to carry out political interventions. Wiking's elaborate study in 1983 lists
various justifications that could all be considered to fall broadly under the development
thesis. These include the lack of success in nation building and economic
The lack of success in nation building includes accusations of tribalism
and the failure to unite the nation. Wiking, for instance, notes that Major General
Juvenal Habyalimana's coup
on accusations of increased national disunity during President Gregoire Kayibanda's
rule. Idi Amin's coup of
intervention to prevent the then Ugandan leader Milton Obote's continued ethnic
policies against the Ganda people.
The guardian perspective acknowledges the military as the unit that is
entrusted with the nation's defense and military coups are, therefore, seen as
part of the maintenance of political sanity and, thus, a necessary part of national
defense. An example is political power tussles that are usually announced as
reasons for several African military coups. Such tussles frequently emerge after
elections when the loser refuses to concede victory and claims electoral malpractice.
Rarely do presidential electoral losers concede victory in most African
countries. Moreover, there are several election frauds that take place during
these elections that it is easy to find reasons for an electoral defeat. The power
tussles that follow those elections are usually protracted and they threaten the
country's peace. There are other power tussles that are not directly related to
Wiking lists lack of law and order; unlawful acts of the government,
and the army's duty to guarantee order as additional justifications usually announced
by coup leaders. These additional justifications can all be considered
also as being part of the guardian perspective. Coup leaders often give several
justifications to support their activities and these justifications can fall both
within the development thesis and the guardian perspective.
Wiking listed numerous other reasons that cannot easily be classified as
either a development thesis or a guardian perspective. However, they all are
announced reasons, including the following: lack of democracy, corruption,
interference in military affairs, and inadequate military budgets.
Let us elaborate more on the "lack of democracy," which should be absorbed
with a pinch of doubt. Coming from the military, this accusation is incredible.
Remarkably, the Malian coup leaders of 1968 had accused President
Modibo Keita of being dictatorial and undemocratic but the subsequent military
regime hardly proved different.
Corruption is frequently used as an excuse for military coups. Coup
makers point to various and sometimes verifiable examples of government corruption.
This wins immediate support for the coup makers but does not stop
corruption. The coup makers become engrossed in corruption. Several coup
makers have led some of the most corrupt governments in
Jean-Bedel Bokassa in
Coup makers have also pointed to interference in military affairs as
well as inadequate military budgets as reasons for military coups..
since 1960 – not to mention the huge losses in terms of infrastructure and economic
opportunities. In comparison to other
of an inter-state conflict continent, although a few have occurred. The typical conflict
involving an African military force is an intra-state conflict, such as a civil war, rebellion,
secession attempt, ethnic and/or
religious strife or even a genocide (in
war in 1976, the
conflicts that have not mutated into wars on a regional scale.
are perhaps three or four key forms/contexts of post-coup roles or identities
for the Military in
1) using the graphic about military interventions above, we have the classic role of protecting nation against the enemy - against insurgents - Boko Haram etc
2) but you have the more problematic role in engaging with 'liberation forces' where government forces are fighting with home grown opposition forces who have formed armies
rebels - Angola/Mozambique
civil war - which itself in the case of
also each other, as well as
Angolans fighting alongside the imperial power. The MPLA, largely representing
the mixed-race coastal elites, came precariously to power in
mostly thanks to Cuban and Soviet support, and fought a 30 year-long civil war, primarily against the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi, themselves supported and supplied
by the West. The military wing of
the African National Congress had its training camps in
Congress), which thus led to
South African incursions into
South Africans, of course)
fighting alongside the MPLA. Finally, apartheid-era
mercenaries, as well as a number of other nationalities, aligned against the SWAPO liberation movement, itself allied with the ANC.
3) Use of military in inter-state wars
The most important inter-state conflicts took place in
dispute over the Bakassi
island claims. Water-related clashes have also been fairly common, such as the
1974 dispute between
Agacher water well, or even the
4) Use of Military for Peace-keeping
Regional involvement in the settlement of disputes has been uneven over the decades.
African-led interventions such as those of the African Union are quite rare. From the
first operation, with 2,600
personnel deployed to
of 850 Nigerians to
recently, African armies have become increasingly engaged in peacekeeping, peacebuilding
and post-conflict activities in a regional and multi-national context. However, their
mandates have mostly encompassed non-coercive, stabilisation-related tasks rather
than high-end peace-enforcement and combat ones.
A recent and promising exception – and experience – is represented by the Multinational
Joint Task Force (MNTJF)
assembled to fight against Boko Haram
reluctant for some time to acknowledge
that it needed help and
clout on Nigerian soil. Yet the adoption of a regional approach to counter the sect
for approximately one third of all civilian killings across
and the improvements made in terms of intelligence sharing and operational coordination
have brought tangible results and may come to represent a precedent to build upon
in the future.
5) Keeping them in the Barracks as Civil-Military relations or as fear of worse....
"democratic civil–military relations, it remains a critical issue in a number of
states. The nature of democratic civil–military relations implies an adherence to
principles that conform to accountable, legitimate democratic authorities, and
the existence of a parliament that exercises oversight over the military and
authorises the declaration of war and also makes the executive accountability to
it in terms of the character of its defence policy. Democratic civil–military
relations is also defined in terms of good governance to the security sector, and
accountability by individual members of the security sector to national and
international laws, as well as political neutrality (Ngoma)"
The military are coup-makers and this is always a threat to leaders/government.
So how do you keep the army in the barracks? (and see (6))
Governments often attempt to establish paramilitary organizations as a check on the power of the armed forces.
This can increase where there is a personalist style of rule by a leader who rules on whim rather than law and institutions. He needs a security agency against a military who has endogenous forces of identity i.e. military traditions. Their loyalty as such cannot be taken for granted. This a personalist leader need a personally commanded force against the military. The cost of coup-making have to be high so as to keep them back in barracks. But equally personal leaders are so autocractic and run such dreadful regimes that they are likely to be threatened from rebel armies or from other countries trying to depose them and thus may need the proper army to defend them...
A coup led by the military is often the main threat to the existing
regime. Policymakers often view expenditures on the armed forces as a
way to win their support. Politically weak governments may attempt to
win support from the military by higher levels of defense spending
(Snider, 1989). However, increases in military spending may only be
partially effective in winning the loyalty of the military and may simply
serve to strengthen the primary threat to the existing government (Ross,
1988). On the other hand, any reduction of military spending is likely to
turn the military against the government.
A more effective strategy may be to build paramilitary organizations’
loyalty to the government and make them strong enough to oppose any
attempts to overthrow the regime. An example is the Juventud en
Marcha con Macias (JMCM)
paramilitary organization of ‘Guinean Youth’ by Francisco Macias
Nguema after his election in 1968. When a coup overthrew his
government in March 1969, he was able to regain power with the help
of the JMCM. Nguema then used the JMCM, his presidential militia,
and the National Guard to maintain his rule until another coup
overthrew him in 1979. These cornerstones of the regime were all
organizations designed to deal with the internal dissent that was the
primary threat to the government. (Dowdle)
Political leaders try to win the support of the paramilitary organizations
by trying establishing clientelistic relationships. The political leaders
allocate government resources to the paramilitary in exchange for the
paramilitary’s performance of security duties and ability to counter any
threat to regime survivability from the regular military. Clapham
(1982a: 4–8) identifies four characteristics necessary for the establishment
of clientelism. First, one group must have a monopoly on critical
resources. Second, the client should find these resources so valuable that
the patron is willing to exchange their services for the patron’s resources.
Third, the patron should prevent the client group, as a whole, from
forming a united front to seize control of these resources from the
patron. Fourth, the state apparatus allocates public resources based on
personalistic grounds instead of predictable and universalistic ones. The
next task is to examine the effectiveness of clientelistic relationship
between political leaders and paramilitary organizations. (Dowdle)
7) Armies are popular and this makes them difficult to control in terms of civil-military relations.
8) The Military from outside:
Arms as Aid
other non-African forces inside
9) State capture by the Military:
The military is not elected by anyone and for that reason, its intervention in the political process of a country,
even at a peripheral level, is harmful for the democratic process and accountability. Some of its other important
implications are as follows: the military may be involved in government on account of an actual or created internal
or external threat to national sovereignty. This situation implies the distortion of government policy because certain
policy options need to be required and implemented to meet this threat; for instance, a reallocation of budget in
favor of the military at the cost of other important budget allocations. The threat of a military take over can force
an elected government to change its policy in line with the desires of the military or may even replace it by another
government more acquiescent to the wishes of the military. If a military take over, or a threat of take over, indicates
inability of the present government to function effectively then the economy will pose high risks for foreign businesses
and a full-scale military regime poses the greatest risk. Although a military regime may temporarily provide stability
and therefore reduce risks for businesses in the short term, in the longer term risk will almost certainly rise for
two major reasons: the system of governance will be become corrupt and, second, the continuation of such
a government may create an armed opposition (Majeed)